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INTRODUCTION
"Jane" allowed her ex-boyfriend to photograph her naked
because, as he assured her, it would be for his eyes only.1 After
their breakup, he betrayed her trust.2 On a popular "revenge porn"
site, he uploaded her naked photo along with her contact
information. 3 Jane received e-mails, calls, and Facebook friend
requests from strangers, many of whom wanted sex.4
According to the officers, nothing could be done because her ex
had not violated her state's criminal harassment law.5 One post was
an isolated event, not a harassing course of conduct as required by
the law.6 Also, her ex had not threatened her or solicited others to
stalk her.7 If Jane's ex had secretly photographed her, he might
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1. One of us (Citron) spoke to "Jane" just after the post appeared online.
Telephone Interview with "Jane" (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter Interview with
Jane] (notes on file with Danielle Citron); Danielle Keats Citron, "Revenge
Porn" Should Be a Crime, CNN (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2013/08/29/opinion/citron.revenge-porn (discussing Jane's experience).
2. Interview with Jane, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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have faced prosecution for publishing the illegally obtained image.8
In her state, however, it was legal to publish Jane's naked photo
taken with her consent even though her consent was premised on
the promise the photo would remain private.9
Nonconsensual pornography' 0 involves the distribution of
sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent. This
includes images originally obtained without consent (e.g., hidden
recordings or recordings of sexual assaults) as well as images
originally obtained with consent, usually within the context of a
private or confidential relationship (e.g., images consensually given
to an intimate partner who later distributes them without consent,
popularly referred to as "revenge porn"). Because the term "revenge
porn" is used so frequently as shorthand for all forms of
nonconsensual pornography, we will use it interchangeably with
nonconsensual porn.
Publishing Jane's nude photo without her consent was an
egregious privacy violation that deserves criminal punishment.
Criminalizing privacy invasions is not new. In their
groundbreaking article The Right to Privacy, published in 1890,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that "[i]t would
doubtless be desirable that the privacy of the individual should
receive the added protection of the criminal law."11
Over the past hundred years, state and federal legislators have
taken Warren and Brandeis's advice and criminalized many privacy
invasions. The Privacy Act of 1974 includes criminal penalties for
the disclosure of agency records containing individually identifiable
information to any person or agency not entitled to receive it.12
Federal laws against identity theft criminalize, inter alia, the
transfer or use of another person's means of identification in
connection with any state felony or violation of federal law. 13
Federal laws prohibit the wrongful disclosure of individually
identifiable health information.14 The federal Video Voyeurism
Prevention Act of 2004 bans intentionally recording or broadcasting
an image of another person in a state of undress without that
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Nonconsensual pornography is also sometimes referred to as "revenge
porn," "cyber rape," or "involuntary porn."
11. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 219 (1890). Warren and Brandeis noted that possible criminal
legislation could punish as a felony the publication of "any statement
concerning the private life or affairs of another, after being requested in
writing... not to publish such statement" provided the statement does not
concern someone's qualifications for public office or profession or involve a
matter of public interest. Id. at 219 n.8.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(i)(1) (2012).
13. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
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person's consent under circumstances in which the person enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 15 Many state voyeurism laws
criminalize the viewing or recording of a person's intimate parts
without permission. 16
Why, then, are there so few laws banning nonconsensual
pornography to date? A combination of factors is at work: lack of
understanding about the gravity, scope, and dynamics of the
problem; historical indifference and hostility to women's autonomy;
inconsistent conceptions of contextual privacy; and
misunderstandings of First Amendment doctrine.
Revenge porn victims have only recently come forward to
describe the grave harms they have suffered, including stalking, loss
of professional and educational opportunities, and psychological
damage. As with domestic violence and sexual assault, victims of
revenge porn suffer negative consequences for speaking out,
including the risk of increased harm. 17 We are only now beginning
to get a sense of how large the problem of revenge porn is now that
brave, outspoken victims have opened a space for others to tell their
stories.' 8 The fact that nonconsensual porn so often involves the
Internet and social media, the public, law enforcement, and the
judiciary sometimes struggle to understand the mechanics of the
conduct and the devastation it can cause.
Our society has a poor track record in addressing harms that
take women and girls as their primary targets. Though much
progress has been made towards gender equality, much social, legal,
and political power remains in the hands of men. The fight to
recognize domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment
as serious issues has been long and difficult, and the tendency to
tolerate, trivialize, or dismiss these harms persists.19 As revenge
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1801. This statute's definition of "capture" includes
"broadcasting," which suggests that it could be used to apply to the
nonconsensual disclosure of such images. However, the statute's jurisdiction is
very limited, confined to the "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States." Id.
16. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS (2d ed. 2013); Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse,
Voyeurism Statutes 2009, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N (Mar. 2009),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/voyeurism-statutes-mar09.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim of Revenge Porn. I Don't
Want Anyone Else to Face This, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-porn-victim-
maryland-law-change; Holly Jacobs, Victims of Revenge Porn Deserve Real
Change, THEGUARDIAN (October 8, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/victims-revenge-porn-deserve-protection.
18. See, generally, Chiarini, supra note 17; Jacobs, supra note 17.
19. Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392-95 (2009); Mary Anne Franks,
How to Feel like a Woman, or Why Punishment Is a Drag, 61 UCLA L. REV. 566,
569-72, 580-84 (2014).
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porn affects women and girls far more frequently than men and
boys, and creates far more serious consequences for them, the
eagerness to minimize its harm is sadly predictable.
This disregard for harms undermining women's autonomy is
closely tied to idiosyncratic, dangerous views about consent with
regard to sex. Some argue that a woman's consensual sharing of
sexually explicit photos with a trusted confidant should be taken as
wide-ranging permission to share them with the public. 20 Said
another way, a victim's consent in one context is taken as consent
for other contexts. That is the same kind of dangerous mentality at
work in sexual assault and sexual harassment. For years, women
have had to struggle with legal and social disregard of their sexual
boundaries. While most people today would rightly recoil at the
suggestion that a woman's consent to sleep with one man can be
taken as consent to sleep with all of his friends, this is the very logic
of revenge porn apologists.
Outside of sexual practices, most people recognize that consent
is context-specific. Privacy regulation and best practices make clear
that permitting an entity to use information in one context does not
confer consent to use it in another context without the subject's
permission. 21 Individual and societal expectations of privacy are
tailored to specific circumstances. 22 The nonconsensual sharing of
an individual's intimate photos should be no different; consent
within a trusted relationship does not equal consent outside of that
relationship. We should no more blame individuals for trusting
loved ones with intimate images than we blame someone for
trusting a financial advisor not to share sensitive information with
strangers on the street.
While some of the First Amendment concerns regarding
anti-revenge porn laws are valid, many of them reflect the tendency
to treat sexual autonomy, especially women's sexual autonomy, as a
20. Lara Prendergast, Revenge Porn's Ukip Poster Girl Highlights the
Dangers of Digital Media, SPECTATOR (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM),
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2014/04/revenge-porns-new-poster-girl-
highlights-the-dangers-of-digital-media (arguing that if individuals share nude
images of themselves they are doing it "with the knowledge that it may one day
end up online"); Callie Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos,
SFGATE, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Public-humiliation-over-private-
photos-4264155.php (last updated Feb. 10, 2013) (quoting revenge porn site
operator as saying, "When you take a nude photograph of yourself and you send
it to this other person, or when you allow someone to take a nude photograph of
you, by your very actions you have reduced your expectation of privacy").
21. See generally sources cited supra note 19 (discussing privacy
regulations).
22. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 129 (2010);
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007) [hereinafter SOLOVE,
FUTURE OF REPUTATION]; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 47 (2008)
[hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 923-25 (2005).
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category less deserving of respect than other social values. As
scholars like Frederick Schauer 23 and Neil Richards 24 have pointed
out, many regulations of speech and expression proceed without any
strident First Amendment objections, including fraud, trade secrets,
and product labeling.
In this Article we make the case for the direct criminalization of
nonconsensual pornography. Current civil law remedies, including
copyright remedies, are an ineffective deterrent to revenge porn. If
they were, we would likely not be witnessing the rise in reports of
victimization as well as the proliferation in revenge porn websites.
According to attorney Mitchell Matorin, who has represented
revenge porn victims, "In the real world, civil lawsuits are no
remedy at all."25  Among the reasons that civil litigation is
ineffective is the fact that even a successful suit cannot stop the
spread of an image already disclosed, and most disclosers know they
are unlikely ever to be sued. Most victims do not have either the
time or money to bring claims, and litigation may make little sense
even for those who can afford to sue if perpetrators have few assets.
While perpetrators may have little fear of civil litigation or
copyright claims, the threat of criminal penalties is a different
matter. Since criminal convictions in most cases stay on one's
record forever, they are much less likely to be ignored. While some
existing criminal laws can be mobilized against revenge porn, on the
whole, existing criminal laws simply do not effectively address the
issue.
Criminalizing nonconsensual pornography is also appropriate
and necessary to convey the proper level of social condemnation for
this behavior. Given that a response from the criminal justice
system is essential, we hope to help lawmakers interested in
drafting such laws. We offer our suggestions for drafting revenge
porn legislation that would comport with the First Amendment and
Due Process concerns.
This Article will unfold as follows. Part I responds to faulty
assumptions that have obscured a full view of the damage that
revenge pornography inflicts. It corrects misunderstandings about
consent that have prevented us from criminalizing revenge porn.
Part II explores why civil law alone cannot effectively address
nonconsensual pornography. Part III assesses the criminal law
23. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765,
1767-74 (2004).
24. See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1171 (2005).
25. See Mitchell A. Matorin, In the Real World, Revenge Porn is Far Worse
Than Making It Illegal, TPM (Oct. 18, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/our-current-law-is-completely-inadequate-
for-dealing-with-revenge-porn.
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landscape. It discusses the deficits of current criminal law. Then, it
considers current legislative proposals to prohibit revenge porn.
Part IV responds to First Amendment concerns. Part V offers our
recommendations.
I. MYTHS ABOUT REVENGE PORN
This Part has two objectives. The first is to debunk the notion
that the harm revenge porn inflicts is trivial. Lawmakers are
unlikely to mobilize against nonconsensual pornography without a
full appreciation of its harms. The second goal is to tackle society's
current inability to understand the contextual nature of consent
when it comes to matters of sexual privacy and autonomy. Privacy
law and scholarship has recognized the importance of context in
evaluating consent, and social norms reflect this insight. The same
should be true for matters of intimate sexual conduct.
A. Understanding Revenge Porn's Damage
In 2007, a man allegedly made numerous copies of DVDs of his
ex-girlfriend performing sex acts and distributed them on random
car windshields, along with the woman's name, address, and phone
number.26 He was angry that the woman had broken off their
relationship.27 The woman, who had not known that the intimate
acts had been recorded, began receiving visits and phone calls from
strange men who took the video as a sexual proposition. 28
Today, intimate photos are increasingly being distributed
online, potentially reaching thousands, even millions of people, with
a click of a mouse. A person's nude photo can be uploaded to a
website where thousands of people can view and repost it. In short
order, the image can appear prominently in a search of the victim's
name. It can be e-mailed or otherwise exhibited to the victim's
family, employers, coworkers, and friends. The Internet provides a
staggering means of amplification, extending the reach of content in
unimaginable ways.
Revenge porn's serious consequences warrant its
criminalization. Nonconsensual pornography raises the risk of
offline stalking and physical attack. In a study of 1,244 individuals,
over 50% of victims reported that their naked photos appeared next
to their full name and social network profile; over 20% of victims
reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers
26. Former Boyfriend Pleads No Contest over Sex DVDs, CHESTERFIELD
OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/news/2007-04-
25/news/009.html.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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appeared next to their naked photos.29 Posting naked images next
to a person's contact information often encourages strangers to
confront the person offline. Many revenge porn victims like Jane
rightly worry that anonymous callers and e-mailers would follow up
on their sexual demands in person.
Victims' fear can be profound. They do not feel safe leaving
their homes. Jane, for example, did not go to work for days after she
discovered the postings.30  Hollie Toups, a thirty-three-year-old
teacher's aide, explained that she was afraid to leave her home after
someone posted her nude photograph, home address, and Facebook
profile on a porn site.3 1 "I don't want to go out alone," she explained,
"because I don't know what might happen. 3 2
Victims struggle especially with anxiety, and some suffer panic
attacks. Anorexia nervosa and depression are common ailments for
individuals who are harassed online.3 3 Researchers have found that
cyber harassment victims' anxiety grows more severe over time. 34
Victims have difficulty thinking positive thoughts and doing their
work. According to a study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights
Initiative, over 80% of revenge porn victims experience severe
emotional distress and anxiety.35
Revenge porn is often a form of domestic violence. Frequently,
the intimate images are themselves the result of an abuser's
coercion of a reluctant partner.36 In numerous cases, abusers have
threatened to disclose intimate images of their partners when
victims attempt to leave the relationship. 37 Abusers use the threat
of disclosure to keep their partners under their control, making good
on the threat once their partners find the courage to leave.
29. Cyber Civil Rights Statistics on Revenge Porn, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2013) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Revenge Porn Statistics].
30. Interview with Jane, supra note 1.
31. Caille Millner, Public Humiliation over Private Photos, SFGATE,
http://www.sfgate.com/opinionarticle/Public-humiliation-over-private-photos-
4264155.php#photo-4161587 (last updated Feb. 10, 2013, 3:21 PM).
32. Id.
33. Suicide Spurs Web to Regulation in South Korea, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 14,
2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/10/14/when-
words-kill.html.
34. Matt R. Nobles et al., Protection Against Pursuit: A Conceptual and
Empirical Comparison of Cyberstalking and Stalking Victimization Among a
National Sample, JUST. Q. 1, 20, 22-23 (2012).
35. Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29.
36. See, e.g., Katie Smith, What Revenge Porn Did to Me, REFINERY29 (Nov.
18, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2013/11/57495/revenge-porn
#page-2 ("But about two and a half years into the relationship, he started
badgering me about making a video. He got fixated on it ... he would ask me,
'Why don't you want to do it? Don't you trust me?' He just kept asking, and got
more and more mean about it-'Don't you care about our sex life? Don't you care
about things not being boring?"').
37. See, e.g., Chiarini, supra note 7.
2014]
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The professional costs of revenge porn are steep. Because
Internet searches of victims' names prominently display their naked
images or videos, many lose their jobs. Schools have terminated
teachers whose naked pictures appeared online. A government
agency ended a woman's employment after a coworker circulated
her nude photograph to colleagues. 38
Victims may be unable to find work at all. Most employers rely
on candidates' online reputations as an employment screen.
According to a 2009 study commissioned by Microsoft, nearly 80% of
employers consult search engines to collect intelligence on job
applicants, and, about 70% of the time, they reject applicants due to
their findings. 39 Common reasons for not interviewing and hiring
applicants include concerns about their "lifestyle," "inappropriate"
online comments, and "unsuitable" photographs, videos, and
information about them.40
Recruiters do not contact victims to see if they posted the nude
photos of themselves or if someone else did in violation of their trust.
The "simple but regrettable truth is that after consulting search
results, employers don't call revenge porn victims to schedule"
interviews or to extend offers. 41 Employers do not want to hire
individuals whose search results might reflect poorly on the
employer. 42
To avoid further abuse, targeted individuals withdraw from
online activities, which can be costly in many respects. Closing
down one's blog can mean a loss of income and other career
opportunities. 43 In some fields, blogging is key to getting a job.
38. Second Amended Complaint at 3, 8, Lester v. Mineta, No. C-04-3074 SI(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 104226 (noting violations of: (1) The Civil
Rights Act of 1964; (2) The Rehabilitation Act; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
(BIVENS); (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1986).
39. Online Reputation in a Connected World, JOB-HUNT 1, 3, 8 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.job-hunt.org/guides/DPD-Online-Reputation-Researchoverview
.pdf.
40. MATr IVESTER, LOL ... OMG! WHAT EVERY STUDENT NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT ONLINE REPUTATION MANAGEMENT, DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP AND
CYBERBULLYING 95 (2011).
41. Citron, supra note 1.
42. To be sure, employers refuse to interview or hire individuals for a
variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, nonconsensual pornography. It
cannot be denied, however, that revenge porn has a negative impact.
Employers have no incentive to hire someone whose online reputation could
jeopardize the esteem of clients and business partners. Their economic
incentive is to attract more business. Avoiding hiring someone who could cast
doubt on the firm's credibility is just smart business.
43. See Penelope Trunk, Blog Under Your Real Name, and Ignore the
Harassment, PENELOPE TRUNK (July 19, 2007), http://blog.penelopetrunk.com
/2007/07/19/blog-under-your-real-name-and-ignore-the-harassment (explaining
that women who write under pseudonyms miss opportunities associated with
blogging under their real names, such as networking opportunities and
expertise associated with the author's name).
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According to technology blogger Robert Scoble, people who do not
blog are "never going to be included in the [technology] industry."44
When victims shut down their profiles on social media platforms like
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, they are saddled with low social
media influence scores that can impair their ability to obtain
employment. 45  Companies like Klout measure people's online
influence by looking at their number of social media followers,
updates, likes, retweets, and shares. Not uncommonly, employers
refuse to hire individuals with low social media influence scores. 46
Aside from these traditional harms, revenge porn can also
amount to a degrading form of sexual harassment. It exposes
victims' sexuality in humiliating ways. Victims' naked photos
appear on slut-shaming 47 sites, such as Cheaterville.com and
MyEx.com. Once their naked images are exposed, anonymous
strangers can send e-mail messages that threaten rape. Some have
said: "First I will rape you, then I'll kill you." 48 Victims internalize
these frightening and demeaning messages. 49 Women would more
likely suffer harm as a result of the posting of their naked images
than their male counterparts. Gender stereotypes help explain
why-women would be seen as immoral sluts for engaging in sexual
activity, whereas men's sexual activity is generally a point of
pride. 50
While nonconsensual pornography can affect both men and
women, empirical evidence indicates that nonconsensual
pornography primarily affects women and girls. In a study
conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 90% of those
victimized by revenge porn were female. 51  Nonconsensual
pornography, like rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment,
belongs to the category of violence that violates legal and social
commitments to equality. It denies women and girls control over
their own bodies and lives. Not only does it inflict serious and, in
many cases, irremediable injury on individual victims, it constitutes
a vicious form of sex discrimination.
44. Ellen Nakashima, Sexual Threats Stifle Some Female Bloggers, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at Al.
45. Seth Stevenson, Popularity Counts, WIRED, May 2012, at 120, 122.
46. Id. at 120-22.
47. "Slut-shaming" criticizes women for sexual activity. As noted journalist
Emily Bazelon explains, slut-shaming is "retrograde, the opposite of feminist.
Calling a girl a slut warns her that there's a line: she can be sexual but not too
sexual." EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF
BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 95
(2013).
48. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 20).
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. There are exceptions, of course.
51. See Revenge Porn Statistics, supra note 29.
2014]
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Revenge porn is a form of cyber harassment and cyber stalking
whose victims are predominantly female. 52 The U.S. National
Violence Against Women Survey reports that 60% of cyber stalking
victims are women.53 For over a decade, Working to Halt Online
Abuse ("WHOA") has collected information from cyber harassment
victims. Of the 3,787 individuals reporting cyber harassment to
WHOA from 2000 to 2012, 72.5% were female, 22.5% were male, and
5% were unknown. 54  A victim's actual or perceived sexual
orientation seems to play a role as well. Research suggests that
sexual minorities are more vulnerable to cyber harassment than
heterosexuals. 55
B. The Consent Conundrum
Consensual sharing of intimate images is often done with the
implied or express understanding that such images will remain
confidential. As revenge porn victims have told us time and again,
they shared their explicit images or permitted the naked photos to
be taken because, and only because, their partners assured them
that the explicit images would be kept confidential.
Nonetheless, the public tends to have difficulty recognizing the
significance of such implied confidences in sexual contexts. Critics
resist the criminalization of revenge porn on the grounds that
consensual sharing in one context-a trusted relationship-
translates into consent in other contexts-posting to the world.
That understanding of consent not only runs against widely shared
intuitions about other activities but also against the insights of
privacy law and scholarship.
52. Cyber harassment is often understood to involve the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress accomplished by online speech that is
persistent enough to amount to a "course of conduct," rather than an isolated
incident. CITRON, supra note 28, at 6. Cyber stalking has a more narrow
meaning: it covers an online "course of conduct" designed to cause someone to
fear bodily harm that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her
safety. Id.
53. Molly M. Ginty, Cyberstalking Turns Web Technologies into Weapons;
Women Face Violence via Social Media, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Apr. 7, 2012, at Ji.
54. Comparison Statistics 2000-2012, WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE 1, 1
(2014), http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2012.pdf.
WHOA's statistics are gleaned from individuals who contact their organization
through their website. The organization's statistics are not as comprehensive
as the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which sponsored a national survey of
individuals who experienced offline and online stalking. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, an estimated 3.4 million people experienced real
space stalking alone, while an estimated 850,000 individuals experienced
stalking with both online and offline features. Katrina Baum et al., Stalking
Victimization in the United States, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE 1, 5 (2009),
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/stalking-victimization.pdf.
55. Jerry Finn, A Survey of Online Harassment at a University Campus, 19
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 468, 477 (2004).
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Consent to share information in one context does not serve as
consent to share this information in another context. When a
person gives her credit card to a waiter, she is not consenting to let
the waiter use that card to make personal purchases. When a
person entrusts a doctor with sensitive health information, he is not
authorizing that doctor to share that information with the public.
What lovers share with each other is not equivalent to what they
share with coworkers, acquaintances, or employers. Consent is
contextual; it is not an on/off switch.
Consent's contextual nature is a staple of information privacy
law. A core teaching of the Fair Information Practice Principles is
that sharing information for one purpose is not permission to share
for other uses. 56 Policymakers have long recognized the importance
of context to the sharing of sensitive information. Congress passed
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to ensure that the trust of financial
institutions' customers would not be betrayed. 57  With few
exceptions, financial institutions cannot share their customers'
financial information with third parties.58 Similarly, the Video
Privacy Protection Act recognizes that individuals may be willing to
share their preferences for certain kinds of films with their video
providers but not with the world at large.59 These laws recognize
the contextual nature of consent-disclosing information to one
entity does not signal consent to pass it on to others. 60
In its recent report, "Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change," the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") laid out best
privacy practices principles for private entities. 61  A key
recommendation was the recognition that a consumer's consent to
share information in one context does not translate into consent to
share that information in other contexts.62 In instances where
56. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf. (outlining five of the Fair
Information Practice Principles).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012) (addressing that "[i]t is the Policy of
Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing
obligation to respect the privacy of its customers . . .
58. See id.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
60. The so-called "third-party doctrine" in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence suggests the opposite, but such an understanding is inapt here
for two reasons: one, the Fourth Amendment concerns citizens' relationship to
the government, not to other private citizens, and two, the doctrine has been
strongly criticized even within the Fourth Amendment context, especially in the
wake of the National Security Administration's spying scandals.
61. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-
preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/10120lprivacyreport.pdf.
62. See id. at vi.
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consumers would not expect their information to be shared with
third parties, companies should ask consumers for their permission
for such sharing.63 As the FTC underscored, when data is collected
for one purpose and then treated differently, the failure to respect
the original expectation is a cognizable harm. 64
The FTC's report resonates with the work of privacy scholars.
In her book Privacy in Context, Helen Nissenbaum argues that
privacy is not a binary concept. 65 Information is neither wholly
private nor wholly public. Context and social norms determine the
question. A person, for instance, might be willing to share personal
information with her doctor but not her employer. As Joel
Reidenberg has argued, using data for a purpose other than the one
the subject has permitted should be considered a cognizable harm.66
Lior Strahilevitz's social network theory of privacy explains that
information may deserve privacy protection even if it is shared with
a significant number of people.67 A group's internal norms of
information disclosure play a key role in determinations about
privacy expectations. For example, an HIV-positive person who told
family, friends, and a support group about his HIV status did not
extinguish his privacy interest in the information because the norm
was that it would not be revealed with others who knew him or to
the public at large. 68  Daniel Solove's pragmatic conception of
privacy envisions context as central to understanding and
addressing contemporary privacy problems. 69
As privacy law and literature suggest, consent is situational.
Revenge porn victims share sexually explicit photographs of
themselves with others based on the understanding that the photos
remain confidential. Sharing sensitive information, whether a nude
photo, Social Security number, or HIV status, with a confidant does
not mean one has waived all privacy expectation in the
information.7 0
63. See, e.g., id. at vi, 55.
64. Id. at 20 n.49 (quoting Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of
Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 881 (2003)).
65. NISSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 144.
66. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 877, 881 (2003).
67. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 13.
68. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994); Strahilevitz, supra note 22.
69. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 13; Danielle Keats Citron
& Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the
Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2010) (reviewing SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 22).
70. See, e.g., Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 494. The refusal to recognize the
contextual nature of consent may stem from a moral disapproval of intimate
photographs. Some might argue that contextual integrity, as Nissenbaum calls
it, is not extended to certain "morally questionable" content. NISSENBAUM,
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II. THE INADEQUACY OF CIVIL ACTIONS
Some commentators oppose regulatory proposals based on the
argument that existing civil remedies can ably address revenge
porn.71 Unfortunately, that is not the case. Civil law can offer
modest deterrence and remedy, but practical concerns often render
them more theoretical than real. As this Part concludes, more
effective disincentives for nonconsensual pornography are needed
than what civil actions can provide.
A. Tort Law
In theory, tort law reaches some of the harm suffered by
revenge porn victims. Victims could sue for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, recovering for severe emotional suffering
intentionally or recklessly caused. Individuals are not expected to
tolerate cruel invasions of their privacy that are extreme and
outrageous.7 2 The privacy tort of public disclosure of private fact
could provide relief. Key to this tort is the public's lack of a
legitimate interest in the disclosed information. Publishing a
private person's nude photos online is not a matter that legitimately
concerns the public.73 Courts have recognized public disclosure
claims where the plaintiff shared private information with one other
trusted person.7 4
Revenge porn victims have brought tort claims and won. A
woman sued her ex-boyfriend after he posted her nude photographs
on twenty-three adult websites next to her contact information and
alleged interest in a "visit or phone call."75 Her ex created an online
advertisement that said she wanted "no strings attached"
masochistic sex.76 Strange men left her frightening voice mails. 77
supra note 22. But determinations of what is morally questionable vary widely
and are generally not a suitable basis for law.
71. See, e.g., Sarah Jeong, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse,
WIRED (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion2013/10/why.
criminalizing-revenge-porn-is-a-bad-idea/.
72. Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the
Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 65 (2012).
73. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Ala.
1964) (upholding disclosure claims where a newspaper published picture of a
woman whose body was exposed after her dress was blown up by air jets
because there was "nothing of legitimate news value in the photograph" and
because, not only was the photograph embarrassing, it could be properly
classified as obscenity given its offensiveness to modesty and the involuntary
nature of the exposure to the public).
74. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW (4th ed. 2011) (discussing court decisions involving public
disclosure of private information).
75. Taylor v. Franko, No. 09-00002 JMSJRLP, 2011 WL 2746714, at *3 (D.
Haw. June 12, 2011).
76. Id. at "4.
77. Id.
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The woman suffered anxiety and a bout of shingles.78 She worried
the abuse would impact her security clearance at work.79 A judge
awarded the woman $425,000 for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, and public disclosure of private fact. 80
One major problem, however, is that most victims lack
resources to bring civil suits. As we have heard from countless
victims, many cannot afford to sue their perpetrators. Having lost
their jobs due to the online posts, they cannot pay their rent, let
alone cover lawyer's fees. It may also be hard to find lawyers willing
to take their cases. Most lawyers do not know this area of law and
are not prepared to handle the trickiness of online harassment
evidence. This reduces the deterrent effect of civil litigation, as
would-be perpetrators are unlikely to fear a course of action that is
unlikely to materialize.
What is more, since plaintiffs in civil court generally have to
proceed under their real names, victims may be reluctant to sue for
fear of unleashing more unwanted publicity. Generally, courts
disfavor pseudonymous litigation because it is assumed to interfere
with the transparency of the judicial process, to deny a defendant's
constitutional right to confront his or her accuser, and to encourage
frivolous claims from being asserted by those whose names and
reputations would not be on the line. Arguments in favor of Jane
Doe lawsuits are considered against the presumption of public
openness-a heavy presumption that often works against plaintiffs
asserting privacy invasions.81
Even in ideal circumstances, where pseudonymous litigation is
permitted and where a lawyer is willing to take the case, it may be
hard to recover much in the way of damages. Defendants often do
not have deep pockets. Victims may be hard pressed to expend their
time and money on lawsuits if defendants are effectively judgment
proof. Then too, an award of damages is no assurance that websites
will comply with requests to take down the images. The removal of
78. See id. at *3.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *5. Not only did the court find that the plaintiff sufficiently
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it upheld the
plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress despite the general
requirement of physical injury. The unique circumstances of the case made
clear that the plaintiffs distress was trustworthy and genuine. Id.; see also Doe
v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW, 2012 WL 2319052, at *8 (D. Colo.
June 13, 2012) (awarding plaintiff damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where the defendant posted the plaintiffs intimate
photographs online, e-mailed them to her husband, and created fake Twitter
accounts displaying them).
81. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) ('The public has an
interest in knowing what the judicial system is doing, an interest frustrated
when any part of litigation is conducted in secret.").
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images is the outcome that most victims desire above all else, and
civil litigation may be unable to make that happen.8 2
Some argue that in cases where individual perpetrators are
judgment proof, victims can bring claims against the websites that
publish revenge porn and in turn drive the demand for it. Generally
speaking, site operators are immunized from tort liability related to
a third party's content. Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act provides, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."8 3 Courts have
interpreted § 230 to largely immunize from liability website owners
and operators for tortious material submitted by third-party users.8 4
According to § 230, "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section," which indicates that the statute
trumps civil and criminal state laws.8 5 If a user hacks into a
person's computer to obtain sexually explicit photographs and
submits the photos, unsolicited, to a revenge porn website, the site
owner would not be liable for displaying it.86
B. Copyright Law
Copyright law can seem like a promising avenue for redress
because § 230 does not immunize websites from federal intellectual
property claims.8 7 If a victim took the image herself then she would
82. See generally Matorin, supra note 25, (explaining that civil litigation
may provide compensation to revenge porn victims but it "won't remove the
photos from the Internet or Google").
83. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
84. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (3rd Cir. 1997).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). A recent letter from the National Association of
Attorneys General urged Congress to revise § 230 so that it cannot preempt
state criminal law. The current wording and interpretation of § 230, these
Attorneys General maintain, impairs criminal prosecutions of child trafficking.
See Letter From the Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress (July 23, 2013),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edulcgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1465
&context=historical.
86. We are leaving for other work the question of whether § 230's immunity
should be narrowed or if the statute in its current form should be understood as
failing to immunize site operators who actively facilitate the posting of revenge
porn. One of us, Citron, supports a narrow amendment to § 230 for sites whose
principal purpose is to host revenge porn. See CITRON, supra note 48, at 176-
77. The other, Franks, believes that a Ninth Circuit decision, Roommates. Com,
supports the notion that sites that purposely solicit the posting of revenge porn
are effectively cocreators of such content and thus enjoy no immunity. Fair
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1164-65 (9th Cir. 2008). Because we agree on so much, we thought it wise to
note our disagreement on this issue and leave exploration of them for separate
endeavors.
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.").
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be considered the copyright owner. In that case, the victim could file
a § 512 notice after registering the copyright.88 The site operator
would have to take down the allegedly infringing content promptly
or lose their immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.89
Even if the victim took the photo herself, however, her right to
sue for a copyright violation may be illusory. Revenge porn sites
often ignore requests for removal because they are not worried about
being sued. They know that most victims cannot afford to hire a
lawyer.
If a victim did not take the sexually explicit photo herself, she
does not own the copyright-it belongs to the photographer. Some
lawyers and scholars have suggested that an expansive conception
of joint authorship might cover these victims,90 but this theory is
untested and may prove to have little traction.91
In any event, even successful copyright actions cannot put the
genie back in the bottle. Once an image is released, getting it
removed from one site does not mean that it will be removed from
every other site to which it has migrated. Even more importantly,
the suggestion that copyright law is an adequate response to
nonconsensual porn mischaracterizes the harm as one of property
rights. While copyright remedies can certainly exist alongside and
supplement other avenues of redress for victims, the harm involved
in nonconsensual pornography cannot be reduced to a property
claim.92
C. Sexual Harassment Law
Does revenge porn constitute actionable sexual harassment? As
defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, sexual
harassment includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature."93  Under current law, protections against sexual
harassment have little force outside of employment and educational
settings.94 Accordingly, while nonconsensual pornography that is
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2012)
89. Site operators are not liable for infringement if they take down the
allegedly infringing content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
90. See Derek Bambauer, Beating Revenge Porn with Copyright (Jan. 25,
2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2013/01/25/beating-revenge-porn-
with-copyright/.
91. See generally Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014).
92. See Matorin, supra note 25 (arguing that attempts to cast revenge porn
as a copyright issue "are absurd").
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2013).
94. In different ways, we have argued that the protection against sexual
harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, should not be so limited. Compare
Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012)
[Vol. 49
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN
produced, distributed, or accessed by a victim's coworkers,
employers, school officials, or fellow students raises the possibility of
a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196495 or Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,96 such claims would not be available to
address nonconsensual pornography falling outside of this narrow
category.
As this discussion shows, civil law cannot meaningfully deter
and redress revenge porn. We now turn to the potential for a
criminal law response.
III. CRIMINAL LAW'S POTENTIAL TO COMBAT REVENGE PORN
A criminal law solution is essential to deter judgment-proof
perpetrators. As attorney and revenge porn expert Erica Johnstone
puts it, "Even if people aren't afraid of being sued because they have
nothing to lose, they are afraid of being convicted of a crime because
that shows up on their record forever."97  Nonconsensual
pornography's rise is surely related to the fact that malicious actors
have little incentive to refrain from such behavior. While some
critics believe that existing criminal law adequately addresses
nonconsensual pornography, this Part highlights how existing
criminal law fails to address most cases of revenge porn.
A. The Importance of Criminal Law
Criminal law has long prohibited privacy invasions and certain
violations of autonomy. Criminal law is essential to send the clear
message to potential perpetrators that nonconsensual pornography
(contending that site operators should be liable for sexual harassment hosted on
their sites), with Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61,
91-95 (2009) (arguing that cyber harassment ought to be addressed as civil
rights violations and thus harassers should face liability under anti-
discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Section 1981 of Title 42, among other claims); see also Danielle Keats Citron &
Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for
Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1436-53 (2011) (arguing that cyber
harassment interferes with victims' ability to interact as digital citizens);
Citron, supra note 10, at 375-77 (arguing that a cyber civil rights legal agenda
has a crucial role in educating the public, law enforcement, courts, and victims
about cyber harassment's interference with victims' equality). Citron's
forthcoming book on cyber harassment proposes an amendment to Title VII
that would permit suits against perpetrators of discriminatory cyber
harassment for interfering with victims' important economic and educational
opportunities. CITRON, supra note 48.
95. tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2012).
96. tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2012).
97. Tracy Clark-Flory, Criminalizing "Revenge Porn," SALON (Apr. 6, 2013,
9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/07/criminalizing-revenge-porn/.
20141
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
inflicts grave privacy and autonomy harms that have real
consequences and penalties. 98
While we share general concerns about overcriminalization and
overincarceration, rejecting the criminalization of serious harms is
not the way to address those concerns. To argue that our society
should not criminalize certain behavior because too many other
kinds of behavior are already criminalized is at best a non sequitur.
Only the shallowest of thinkers would suggest that the question
whether nonconsensual pornography should be
criminalized-indeed, whether any conduct should be
criminalized-should turn on something as contingent and arbitrary
as the number of existing laws. Rather, the question of
criminalization should be a question about the seriousness of the
harm caused and whether such harm is adequately conceptualized
as a harm only to individuals, for which tort remedies are sufficient,
or should be conceptualized as a harm to both individuals and
society as a whole for which civil penalties are not adequate, thus
warranting criminal penalties. 99
We are also sensitive to objections that criminalizing revenge
porn might reinforce the harmful and erroneous perception that
women should be ashamed of their bodies or their sexual activities,
but maintain that recognizing and protecting sexual autonomy does
exactly the opposite.100 A criminal law solution would send the
message that individuals' bodies are their own and that society
recognizes the grave harms that flow from turning individuals into
objects of pornography without their consent.
In this way, a criminal law approach will help us conceptualize
the nonconsensual publication of someone's sexually explicit images
as a form of sexual abuse. When sexual abuse is inflicted on an
individual's physical body, it is considered rape or sexual assault.
The fact that nonconsensual pornography does not involve physical
contact does not change the fact that it is a form of sexual abuse. As
98. See Mary Anne Franks, Why Revenge Porn Must Be a Crime,
NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion
/revenge-porn-crime-article- 1.1702725.
99. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal'7:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REV. 193, 221-22 (1991) (noting, though criticizing, the "standard 'black
letter' law distinction ... that crimes represent injuries to society generally,
while torts involve only private interests," but also conceding that "there are
public values that would be injured if criminal behavior were treated only as
tortious conduct for which the victim must be made whole through
compensation").
100. A comparison can be made here to rape laws. While it is possible to
interpret the criminal punishment for rape as reinforcing the view that women
who are raped are "damaged," we do not think this is a necessary or correct
interpretation. In fact, the real danger lies in failing to seriously punish
violations of sexual autonomy.
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Supreme Court Justice Horace Gray wrote in 1891, 'The
inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory
stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one ... to lay
bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass ... "101
Federal and state criminal laws regarding voyeurism demonstrate
that physical contact is not necessary to cause great harm and
suffering. 102
Video voyeurism laws punish the nonconsensual recording of a
person in a state of undress in places where individuals enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 103 Criminal laws prohibiting
voyeurism rest on the commonly accepted assumption that
observing a person in a state of undress or engaged in sexual
activity without that person's consent not only inflicts dignitary
harms upon the individual observed, but also inflicts a social harm
serious enough to warrant criminal prohibition and punishment.
International criminal law provides precedent and perspective
on this issue. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") have employed a definition of sexual violence
that does not require physical contact. In both tribunals, forced
nudity was found to be a form of sexual violence.1 04 In the Akayesu
case, the ICTR found that "[s]exual violence is not limited to
physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do
not involve penetration or even physical contact."105  In the
Furundzija case, the ICTY similarly found that international
criminal law punishes not only rape, but also "all serious abuses of a
sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a
person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way
that is degrading and humiliating for the victim's dignity."106
The legal and social condemnation of child pornography
exemplifies our collective understanding that the viewing and
distribution-not just production--of certain kinds of sexual images
101. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
102. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012); see also Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution of
Child Abuse, supra note 16 (providing an inventory of state voyeurism
statutes).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1801.
104. See ANN-MARIE DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 135-37 (2005); LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR
146-47 (Helen Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005).
105. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 688 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case
/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay00l.pdf.
106. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 186 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x
/cases/furundzijaltjug/enlfur-tj9812 10e.pdf.
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are harmful. In New York v. Ferber,10 7 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the distribution of child pornography is
distinct from the underlying crime of the sexual abuse of children. 108
The Court observed that "[t]he distribution of photographs and films
depicting sexual activity by juveniles ... [is] a permanent record of
the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated
by their circulation." 109 When images and videos of sexual assaults
and surreptitious observation are distributed and consumed, they
inflict further harms on the victims and on society connected to, but
distinct from, the criminal acts to which the victims were originally
subjected. 110 The trafficking of this material increases the demand
for images and videos that exploit the individuals portrayed. This is
why the Court in Ferber held that it is necessary to shut down the
"distribution network" of child pornography to reduce the sexual
exploitation of children: "The most expeditious if not the only
practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market
for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product." '111
Nonconsensual pornography raises similar concerns. Disclosing
sexually explicit images without permission can have lasting and
destructive consequences. Victims often internalize socially imposed
shame and humiliation every time they see them and every time
they think that others are viewing them.
Consider the experience of sports reporter Erin Andrews. After
a stalker secretly taped her while she undressed in her hotel room,
he posted as many as ten videos of her online. 112 Google Trends
data suggested that just after the release of the videos, much of the
nation began looking for some variation of "Erin Andrews peephole
video."113 Nearly nine months later, Andrews explained, "I haven't
stopped being victimized-I'm going to have to live with this
forever .... When I have kids and they have kids, I'll have to
107. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
108. Id. at 764.
109. Id. at 759.
110. See Emily Bazelon, The Price of a Stolen Childhood, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/magazine/how-much-can-
restitution-help-victims-of-child-pornography.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
111. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
112. Lynn Lamanivong, Erin Andrews' Video Voyeur Gets 2' Years, CNN
(Mar. 16, 2010, 9:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/03/15/espn.erin
.andrews.sentence/; see Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1813-14 (2010) (discussing privacy harms experienced by
Erin Andrews).
113. Steve Johnson, Erin Andrews'Nude Video Coverage Full of Hypocrisy,
CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-23
/entertainment/09072206361erin-andrews-video-web.
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explain to them why this is on the Internet."114  She further
lamented that when she walks into football stadiums to report on a
game, she faces the taunts of fans who have seen her naked
online. 115 She explained that she "felt like [she] was continuing to
be victimized" each time she talked about it.116
Andrews's experience is echoed by that of Lena Chen, who
allowed her ex-boyfriend to take pictures of them having sex.117
After he betrayed her trust and posted the pictures online, the
pictures went viral.118 As Chen explained, feeling ashamed of her
sexuality was not something that came naturally to her, but it is
now something she knows inside and out.119  Victims of
nonconsensual pornography are harmed each time a person views or
shares their intimate images.
B. Current Criminal Law's Limits
Existing federal and state criminal laws have limited
application to the initial posters of nonconsensual pornography and
the laws have even less force with regard to site operators. This
Subpart first explores the potential of criminal harassment statutes
in pursuing the original discloser. Then, it turns to the possibility of
extortion and child pornography charges against revenge porn site
operators.
1. Punishing Original Disclosers Under Criminal Law
Many scholars believe that existing criminal law adequately
addresses revenge porn. Professor Eric Goldman, for instance,
argues that criminal harassment laws punish the distribution of
sexually explicit images when there is intent to harm, but that is not
always true. 120 Two potential hurdles stand in the way.
The first hurdle is that criminal harassment and stalking laws
only apply to defendants who engage in repeated harassing acts.
The federal cyber stalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, bans as a
felony the use of any "interactive computer service" to engage in a
114. Leslie Casimir, The ESPN Girl Takes a Stand, GLAMOUR (Mar. 5, 2010),
http://www.glamour.com/inspired/magazine/2010/03/the-espn-girl-takes-a-
stand.
115. Id.
116. Michael Y. Park, Erin Andrews Calls Peeping-Tom Video a
"Nightmare," PEOPLE (Sept. 1, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://www.people.com/people
/article/0,,20301731,00.html.
117. Lena Chen, I Was the Harvard Harlot, SALON (May 23, 2011, 9:01 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2011/05/24/harvardharlotsexualshame.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Eric Goldman, California's New Law Shows It's Not Easy to
Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/ericgoldmanl2013/10/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-not-easy-to-
regulate-revenge-porn].
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"course of conduct" intended to harass or intimidate someone in
another state that either places that person in reasonable fear of
serious bodily injury or death or that would reasonably be expected
to cause the person to suffer "substantial emotional distress."121
A single posting of someone's name, address, and sexually
explicit image can cause serious damage but would not amount to a
harassing "course of conduct." A revenge porn post can go viral, but
the poster who started the cascade could evade harassment charges.
As Jane's experience attests, a single post, e-mail, or other
disclosure of nonconsensual pornography can cause grave harm.122
The second problem is that some state harassment laws only
apply to persistent abuse communicated directly to victims. A New
York state court recently dismissed charges against a man who
posted his ex-girlfriend's nude photos on Twitter and sent the photos
to the woman's employer and sister.123 The court justified its
dismissal of the aggravated harassment charge on the grounds that
the man had not sent the nude photos to the woman herself, but
rather to others.1 24 Revenge porn posted on third-party sites would
not be banned under harassment statutes that require direct contact
with victims. 1 25
Even when revenge porn does fit the definition of criminal
harassment, police may decline to get involved. Victims are often
told that the behavior is not serious enough for an in-depth
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012). Under the federal cyber-stalking statute,
defendants can be punished for up to five years in jail and fined $250,000.
Many states similarly define criminal cyber harassment but treat it as a
misdemeanor with modest sentences and fines. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
265, § 43A (LexisNexis 2010) (covering a willful and malicious engagement in a
pattern of acts or series of acts via e-mail or "internet communications" that is
directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress); SusAN
PRICE, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RESEARCH, 2012-R-0293, OLR
BACKGROUNDER: CYBERSTAKING (2012) (describing variations in the thirty-four
state cyber-stalking laws surveyed by the National Conference of State
Legislatures).
122. Unfortunately, even if revenge porn is part of a broader course of
harassing conduct, law enforcement routinely refuses to take it seriously
because they lack technical understanding of the problem and believe that
conduct regarding sexually intimate images is innocuous. Citron, supra note
19, at 402. That problem extends to revenge porn as well.
123. See Mary Anne Franks, We Need New Laws to Put a Stop to Revenge
Porn, INDEP. (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/we-
need-new-laws-to-put-a-stop-to-revenge-porn-9147620.html.
124. People v. Barber, 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50193(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18,
2014); Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws Out New York Revenge Porn Case, CBS
(Feb. 25, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-throws-out-new-
york-revenge-porn-case/.
125. Id.
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investigation. 126 "They are shooed away because, officers say, they
are to blame for the whole mess, since they chose to share their
intimate pictures."127
Consider Holly Jacobs's case. Hundreds of porn and revenge
porn sites featured her nude images next to her work biography and
e-mail address.128 Some posts falsely claimed that she would have
sex for money and that she had slept with her students. 129 Law
enforcement officers told her that because she voluntarily gave the
photos to her ex-boyfriend, he owned them and could freely share
them.130
Jacobs refused to give up on the potential for criminal law.
After contacting U.S. Senator Marco Rubio's office, the Florida State
Attorney's office took up her case and charged her ex with a
misdemeanor count of cyber stalking.13 1 Investigators traced one of
the porn posts to her ex's IP address. 132 They told Jacobs that they
needed a warrant to search his computer for further evidence
because her ex had claimed that he had been hacked and denied
releasing Jacobs's pictures.133
The charges against her ex were dismissed when prosecutors
decided they could not justify seeking a warrant for a misdemeanor
case.134 Their hands were tied, they said, even though "I've been
hacked" is a standard defense in cyber stalking cases. 135 Jacobs's
case apparently was not serious enough for the police to obtain a
warrant to search a defendant's computer or home.
136
2. Prosecuting Site Operators for Extortion and Child
Pornography
What about website operators' criminal liability under current
state or federal criminal law? Although § 230 immunity is broad, it
is not absolute. It exempts from its reach federal criminal law,
intellectual property law, and the Electronic Communications
126. See Citron, supra note 19, at 375-76 (highlighting the tendency of law
enforcement to dismiss harassment complaints).
127. Danielle Citron, How to Make Revenge Porn a Crime: Worried About
Trampling on Free Speech? Don't Be., SLATE (Nov. 7, 2013, 1:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/jurisprudence/2013/1 1/making-
revenge porn a-crimewithout tramplingfree-speech.html.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. CITRON, supra note 48 (discussing in detail Holly Jacobs's revenge porn
experience); Citron, supra note 19.
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Privacy Act.137 As § 230(e) provides, the statute has "[n]o effect" on
"any [flederal criminal statute" and does not "limit or expand any
law pertaining to intellectual property."138
The recent federal prosecution against revenge porn site
operator Hunter Moore has been invoked as support for the notion
that no new laws are needed to take on revenge porn. In December
2013, federal prosecutors indicted Moore for conspiring to hack into
people's computers to steal their nude images.139 According to the
indictment, Moore paid a computer hacker to access women's
password-protected computers and e-mail accounts to steal their
nude photos for financial gain-profits from his revenge porn site Is
Anyone Up. 140
While the prosecution of Moore is cause for celebration, it is a
mistake to draw from it the conclusion that existing laws are
sufficient to address revenge porn. The fact that one revenge porn
site owner allegedly broke numerous federal laws in running a
revenge porn website does not change the fact that he is facing no
charges for publishing the content itself,141 and that the next
revenge porn entrepreneur will no doubt learn not to make the same
mistakes as Hunter Moore.
State prosecutors are currently pursuing extortion charges
against site operators who call for posters to upload their exes'
naked images and then charge a hefty fee for the removal of those
photos.142 There is a strong argument that § 230's immunity does
not apply to those who extort victims whose predicament they have
helped orchestrate. California Attorney General Kamala Harris has
brought the first cases to press the question. 143
In December 2013, the operator of revenge porn site
UGotPosted, Kevin Bollaert, was indicted for extortion, conspiracy,
and identity theft in violation of California state laws. 144 The site
featured the nude photos, Facebook screen shots, and contact
information of more than 10,000 individuals. 145 According to the
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012).
138. Id.
139. Jessica Roy, Revenge-Porn King Hunter Moore Indicted on Federal
Charges, TIME (Jan. 23, 2014), http://time.com/1703/revenge-porn-king-hunter-
moore-indicted-by-fbi].
140. Id.
141. Justin Mitchell, Law Takes Revenge on "Revenge Porn King," VOICE
Russ. (Jan. 24, 2009, 11:49 AM), http://voiceofrussia.com/us/201401_24/Law-
takes-revenge-on-revenge-porn-king-2424/.
142. See, e.g., Lee Munson, Revenge Porn Operator Facing Charges of
Conspiracy, Extortion and Identity Theft, NAKED SECURITY (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/12/11/revenge-porn-operator-facing-
charges-of-conspiracy-extortion-and-identity-theft/.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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indictment, Bollaert ran the revenge porn site with a companion
takedown site, Change My Reputation. 146 When Bollaert received
complaints from individuals who appeared in nude photos, he
allegedly sent them e-mails directing them to the takedown site,
which charged up to $350 for the removal of photos.147 Attorney
General Harris explained that Bollaert "published intimate photos
of unsuspecting victims and turned their public humiliation and
betrayal into a commodity with the potential to devastate lives."
148
Bollaert will likely challenge the State's identity theft charges
on § 230 grounds. 149 Because California's identity theft laws are
somewhat unusual, 150 it is unclear how successful Bollaert's defense
will be. He may also try to argue that charging for the removal of
user-generated photos is not tantamount to authoring or
codeveloping them, that is, charging for the removal of content is not
the same as paying for or helping develop it.151 Nonetheless, the
State has a strong argument that the extortion charges fall outside §
230's immunity because the charges hinge on what Bollaert himself
did and said, not on what his users posted.
Even if the California Attorney General's charges are dismissed
on § 230 grounds, federal prosecutors could charge Bollaert with
federal criminal extortion charges. Sites that encourage cyber
harassment and charge for its removal (or have a financial
arrangement with removal services) are engaging in extortion.
But of course revenge porn operators who charge for the
removal of images are not the only ones hosting revenge porn.
There are countless other sites and blogs that host revenge porn
that do not engage in extortion. If these criminal prosecutions are
successful, site operators will stop charging for the removal of
photos and the phenomenon will still continue.
Prosecuting site operators for violating federal cyber-stalking
law is even less promising than prosecuting original disclosers.
Most site operators cannot be said to have engaged in a pattern of
harassing conduct vis-A-vis any given victim. They lack the
requisite intent to "kill, injure, harass, or place under surveillance
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Eric Goldman, Should We Cheer the California Attorney General's
Revenge Porn Arrest-or Find It Alarming?, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 1:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/12/1 1/should-we-cheer-the-
california-attorney-generals-revenge-porn-arrest-or-find-it-alarming/.
150. See Ryan Calo, Creative Revenge Porn Charges Filed in California,
FORBES (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo
/2013/12/10/creative-revenge-porn-charges-filed-in-california/.
151. Mary Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions
About CDA Section 230, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2013, 5:36 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/section-230-the-lawless-
internet b_4455090.html.
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with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause substantial
emotional distress" a particular person. 152  Many admitted
purveyors of nonconsensual pornography maintain, with some
plausibility, that their sole intention is to obtain notoriety, fulfill
some sexual desire, or increase traffic for their websites.
What about child pornography laws? While "pornography" is to
some degree regulated by federal criminal law, federal law focuses
almost exclusively on the age of the material's subjects. 153 Little
attention is paid to individuals' consent (or lack thereof) to be
portrayed in such a manner. With regard to original perpetrators of
nonconsensual pornography, both state and federal child
pornography laws can be used to deter and prosecute the production
of sexually explicit material featuring underage individuals. Section
2256 of Title 18 defines child pornography as any visual depiction of
sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (someone under eighteen
years of age).' 54 'Visual depictions include photographs, videos,
digital or computer generated images indistinguishable from an
actual minor, and images created, adapted, or modified, but appear
to depict an identifiable, actual minor."'155 These provisions do not
apply, of course, to victims over the age of eighteen, seriously
limiting the usefulness of these prohibitions in revenge porn cases.
One commentator contends that criminal penalties applicable to
general pornographers could apply to revenge porn site operators. 56
That is not the case. Section 2257 of Title 18 sets out recordkeeping
requirements for those engaged in "producing" pornography. 157 The
statute's definition of "produces" or "producing" pornography tracks
the definition of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
means it does not cover websites that facilitate or distribute
material submitted by third-party users. 58 The statute also focuses
almost exclusively on age-verifying identification. 59 It sets out no
requirements to verify that the individuals portrayed have
consented to the use of their images. While this law may provide
some disincentives for distributing nonconsensual pornography of
underage individuals, it will not have any effect on the distribution
of material featuring adult victims.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).
153. See generally id. § 2256.
154. Id. § 2256.
155. Citizen's Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/citizensguide/citizensguide-porn
.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
156. Jeong, supra note 60.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (providing record-keeping requirements for
those who produce "sexually explicit conduct").
158. See id. § 2257(h)(2) (defining the term "produces").
159. See id. § 2257(b).
[Vol. 49
CRIMINALIZING REVENGE PORN
C. Current Efforts to Criminalize Nonconsensual Pornography
To date, New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, and Utah
are the only states that criminalize the nonconsensual disclosure of
someone's sexually intimate images. 160 During the writing of this
Article, legislators in seventeen states have proposed revenge porn
bills.161 We provide our thoughts on these developments, noting the
strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches and offering
suggestions of our own. We reserve our views on the
constitutionality of these proposals for the next Part.
New Jersey, the first state to criminalize revenge porn, has the
broadest statute, prohibiting the nonconsensual observation,
recording, or disclosure of sexually explicit images. Under New
Jersey law, it is a third-degree crime 162 to post or share a person's
nude or partially nude images without that person's consent. 163 The
New Jersey law provides the following:
An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other
reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate
parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual
penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has
consented to such disclosure. For purposes of this subsection,
"disclose" means sell, manufacture, give, provide, lend, trade,
mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate,
disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise or offer. 164
The crime carries a prison sentence ranging from three to five
years. 165
Although the law has been around for almost a decade, it has
been invoked in only a few cases. 166 In a recent case, the defendant
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2005) (taking effect on Jan. 8, 2004);
S.B. 255, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). Idaho and Utah passed laws in 2014.
See 2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 173 (H.B. 563); 2014 Utah Laws 124 (H.B. 71).
161. Franks has been advising legislators all across the country, from New
York and Wisconsin to Florida and Illinois to name just a few. Franks is also
working with Congresswoman Jackie Speier in drafting a federal revenge porn
bill. Franks and Citron worked with Maryland delegate Jon Cardin in crafting
his revenge porn bill. Legislators in Florida attempted to pass a much less clear
and much less comprehensive bill in their most recent term, but the measure
died in committee. The bill's original sponsors have declared that they will
attempt to introduce the bill again in their next session and have been working
with Franks on revisions. Rick Stone, In Florida, "Revenge Porn" Is a Moving
Target, WLRN (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:56 AM), http://wlrn.org/post/florida-revenge-
porn-moving-target.
162. New Jersey does not use the classifications of "felony" and
"misdemeanor." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2 (West 2005).
163. Id. § 2C:14-9.
164. Id. § 2C:14-9(c).
165. Id. § 2C:43-6.
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and victim exchanged "unclothed" photos of each other while
dating.167 After their break up, the defendant threatened to send
the victim's nude pictures to her employer, a public school. 168 The
defendant followed up on his threat, forwarding the pictures to the
school stating "you have an educator there that is ... not proper."' 69
The defendant admitted to sending the pictures.170 The defendant
was convicted for disclosing naked images given with the
understanding that they would not be shared with others.' 71
In 2010, Rutgers University student Dahrun Ravi was charged
under the New Jersey statute after he secretly filmed his roommate
Tyler Clementi having sex with a man and watched the live feed
with six friends. 7 2 Clementi committed suicide after discovering
what had happened. 7 3 The jury convicted Ravi of various counts of
invasion of privacy, including the nonconsensual "observation" of
Clementi having sex and the nonconsensual "disclosure" of the sex
video.174
On January 8, 2014, Maryland legislator Jon Cardin proposed a
revenge porn bill that resembled the New Jersey approach. 175 The
proposed bill bars the disclosure of a person's sexually explicit or
nude images "knowing that the other person has not consented to
the disclosure."' 76 The proposed bill included various exemptions,
166. In 2012, Brandon Carangelo was charged under the New Jersey statute
for uploading pictures of his ex-girlfriend without her consent. Michaelangelo
Conte, Bayonne Man Charged with Posting Nude Photos of Ex-Girlfriend on
Internet, NJ.coM (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf
/2012/10/bayonne manchargedwithposti.html.
167. State v. Parsons, No. 10-06-01372, 2011 WL 6089210, at *1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1-3.
172. Star-Ledger Staff, Dharun Ravi Sentenced to Jail in Tyler Clementi
Webcam Spying Case, NJ.COM (May 21, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://www.nj.com/news
/index.ssf2012/05/dharun ravi_sentenced.tojail.html.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See H.B. 43, 2014 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2014).
For the purpose of prohibiting a person from intentionally disclosing a
certain sexually explicit image of a certain other person, knowing that
the other person has not consented to the disclosure; providing
penalties for a violation of this Act; providing for the scope of this Act;
providing that this Act does not affect any legal or equitable right or
remedy otherwise provided by law; defining certain terms; and
generally relating to the intentional disclosure of sexually explicit
images.
Id.
176. Id. "'Intimate parts' means the naked genitals, pubic area, or buttocks
of a person or the naked nipple of a female adult person." Id. "'Sexual act' has
the meaning stated in § 3-301 of this title." Id. "'Sexual conduct' has the
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such as the exclusion of images related to matters of public interest.
It reads:
This section does not apply to:
(1) a law enforcement official in connection with a criminal
prosecution;
(2) a person acting in compliance with a subpoena or court
order for use in a legal proceeding;
(3) a person acting with a bona fide and lawful scientific,
educational, governmental, news, or other similar public
purpose; or
(4) a voluntary exposure in a public or commercial setting. 177
The proposed Maryland bill treats nonconsensual pornography as a
felony with up to five years of jail time and a significant fine.
Wisconsin has proposed a similar bill.178
A revenge porn bill proposed by New York lawmakers is
narrower than New Jersey's or Maryland's approach. It covers
sexually explicit photographs captured consensually as part of an
intimate relationship, with the expectation of privacy, and later
disclosed to the public without the consent of the individual
depicted. 17 9 Much like the Maryland proposal, the New York
proposal includes exceptions for law enforcement, legal proceedings,
and voluntary exposures made in public. 180
California's newly adopted revenge porn bill has the narrowest
coverage of all. Adopted in October 1, 2013, the California law
provides that a party is guilty of disorderly conduct if
[any person who photographs or records by any means the
image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable
person, under circumstances where the parties agree or
understand that the image shall remain private, and the
person subsequently distributes the image taken, with the
intent to cause serious emotional distress, and the depicted
person suffers serious emotional distress. 181
meaning stated in § 3-301 of this title." Id. "'Image' includes a photograph, a
film, a videotape, a recording, or a digital or other reproduction." Id.
177. Id.
178. A.B. 462, 2013-2014 Leg. (Wis. 2013).
179. Several different bills on this issue have been proposed in New York.
One of the authors, Franks, worked on the version sponsored by Assemblyman
Braunstein and Senator Griffo, which is the bill discussed here. A.O. 8214,
2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
180. Id.
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 2013).
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The California bill requires that the defendant intend to cause the
victim serious emotional distress, a requirement that is absent from
the New Jersey's bill and other proposals. 8 2 It also demands that
the state prove that victims have suffered serious emotional
distress. 8 3 Its penalty is the weakest, comparatively speaking.
Unlike the New Jersey bill and other proposed bills that classify
nonconsensual pornography as a felony, it is a misdemeanour in
California punishable by up to six months in prison and a $1,000
fine (up to one year in prison and a $2,000 fine for a second
offense). 184
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
What of First Amendment objections to revenge porn
legislation? Would its criminalization transgress First Amendment
doctrine and free speech values? Is nonconsensual pornography
"offensive" speech that must be tolerated or is it instead within the
narrow band of private communications that can be proscribed
within the boundaries of the First Amendment? As we argue in this
Part, it is the latter.
A "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment... is
that the government may not [censor] the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive" or
distasteful. 8 5 Ordinarily, government regulation of the content of
speech-what speech is about-is permissible only in a narrow set of
circumstances. Content regulations have to serve a compelling
interest that cannot be promoted through less restrictive means.
Strict scrutiny review, as it is called, is difficult to satisfy because
we distrust the government to pick winners and losers in the realm
of ideas. Courts err on the side of caution before regulating speech
because free expression is crucial to our ability to govern ourselves,
to discover the truth, and to express ourselves, among other
values.18 6 As the Supreme Court famously declared in New York
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 19, 19.2 (West 2008). Franks worked with
legislative drafters in California to amend the law to provide more protection
for victims and to include explicit exceptions for conduct protected by the First
Amendment. See Sen. Cannella Introduces New Legislation to Combat Revenge
Porn, ANTHONY CANNELLA (Feb. 20, 2014) http://districtl2.cssrc.us/content/sen-
cannella-introduces-new-legislation-combat-revenge-porn.
185. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
186. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may
be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931)).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan, our society has a "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'18 7 Hateful and deeply offensive
words thus enjoy presumptive constitutional protection. 188
Nonetheless, First Amendment doctrine holds that not all forms
of speech regulation are subject to strict scrutiny. Certain
categories of speech can be regulated due to their propensity to
bring about serious harms and only slight contributions to First
Amendment values. They include true threats, speech integral to
criminal conduct, defamation, obscenity, and imminent and likely
incitement of violence. 189 Courts also have employed "less rigorous"
scrutiny in upholding the constitutionality of penalties for
nonconsensual disclosures of private communications, such as sex
tapes, on the ground that such communications are not matters of
public concern.1 90
187. Id. at 270.
188. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant engaged in constitutionally protected speech when
he wore a jacket into a courtroom with "Fuck the Draft" written on its back. Id.
at 16. The Court explained that a governmental interest in regulating offensive
speech could not outweigh the defendant's First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. Id. at 26.
189. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269. The Court has articulated complex
constitutional standards for some of these categories like defamation, erecting a
matrix of fault and damage rules based on whether a plaintiff is a public or
private figure. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-49 (1974). As
free speech scholar Rodney Smolla puts it, the well-defined categories of speech
falling outside the First Amendment's coverage entail elaborate standards of
review, and some constitutional protection is indeed afforded to certain types of
libelous and obscene speech. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and
the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological
Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 501-02 (2013).
190. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm't Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal.
1998). In assessing the constitutionality of certain categories of speech, the
Supreme Court has distinguished speech involving matters of public interest
and speech involving purely private matters. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (finding that the constitutionality of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims depended on whether the emotionally distressing
speech involved matters "of interest to society at large" as determined by its
content, form, and context); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)
(finding that sexually explicit images were not of legitimate news interest in
that they did not inform the public about any aspect of his employer's
functioning and thus the government could fire an employee without running
afoul of the First Amendment); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (upholding a defamation claim because it involved
a purely private matter of a business's credit report that was not subject to the
actual malice standard required for "debate on public issues"); Time v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) (on matters of "legitimate public concern," defamation claims
require proof of actual malice); N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277 (explaining that
in a defamation suit involving a public official, free speech on "matters of public
concern should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open").
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A narrowly crafted revenge porn criminal statute that protects
the privacy of sexually explicit images can be reconciled with the
First Amendment. For support, we can look to the Court's decisions
assessing the constitutionality of civil penalties under the federal
Wiretap Act and lower court decisions on the public disclosure of
private fact tort. We can rely on those decisions because the Court
has generally held that the First Amendment rules applicable to
criminal law are the same as those applicable to tort law. 191
Here it is necessary to take note of the erroneous yet oft-
repeated claim by opponents of criminalization that, while civil
penalties for revenge porn do not violate the First Amendment,
criminal penalties do. This is simply not an accurate statement of
First Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has never
held that speech protected by the First Amendment can be
restricted by civil but not criminal law. In fact, its rulings support
the opposite conclusion:
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of
a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil
law ....- The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that
invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal
statute.... Presumably, a person charged with violation of
this statute enjoys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such as
the requirements of an indictment and of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. These safeguards are not available to the
defendant in a civil action. 192
The Court was explicitly asked to categorically exclude criminal
penalties for truthful reporting about public officials in Landmark,
and it explicitly declined to do so. 193
191. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 277. Indeed, as the Court noted in New
York Times, criminal actions provide even greater protection to defendants than
do civil cases because they require proof beyond reasonable doubt and other
protections afforded to criminal defendants. Id.
192. Id.
193. Landmark Commc'ns Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978)
("Landmark urges as the dispositive answer to the question presented that
truthful reporting about public officials in connection with their public duties is
always insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the First
Amendment.... We find it unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach to
resolve the issue before us."); see generally Danielle Citron, Debunking the First
Amendment Myths Surrounding Revenge Porn Laws, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2014,
11:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/04/18/debunking-
the-first-amendment-myths-surrounding-revenge-porn-laws/ (debunking the
myth that the First Amendment has different rules for civil and criminal
penalties and quoting Eugene Volokh for the proposition that the Court has
"refused invitations to treat civil liability differently from criminal liability for
First Amendment purposes").
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In other words, to argue that civil restrictions of nonconsensual
pornography are constitutionally acceptable while criminal
restrictions are not is logically inconsistent. While one may take the
position that criminalization is unwise or unnecessary for policy
reasons (a position we do not find convincing, as demonstrated
above), such a position finds no support in established First
Amendment doctrine.194
A. Wiretap Decisions
Let us first explore judicial decisions assessing the
constitutionality of penalties for the nonconsensual disclosure of
truthful, lawfully obtained information initially acquired illegally. 195
The Court has held that "state action to punish the publication of
truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards."196
In assessing a newspaper's criminal conviction for publishing a
juvenile defendant's name in a murder case, the Court, in the 1979
decision in Smith v. Daily Mail,197 laid down the now well-
established rule that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials
may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." 9 8
Since then, the Court has consistently refused to adopt a bright-line
rule that truthful publications can never be subjected to civil or
criminal liability for "invading 'an area of privacy' defined by the
State." 99  To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly noted that
press freedom and privacy rights are both "plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of the society."200
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,20' for instance, an unidentified person
intercepted and recorded a cell phone call between the president of a
local teacher's union and the union's chief negotiator. 20 2  The
conversation concerned the negotiations between the union and the
194. See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-
Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 994 (2012)
("[T]he severity of the penalty imposed-though of central importance to the
speaker who bears it-does not normally affect the merits of his free speech
claim.... Speech is either protected, in which case it may not be punished, or
unprotected, in which case it may be punished to a very great degree.").
195. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001); Smith v. Daily
Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979).
196. Smith, 443 U.S. at 102; see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-
41 (1989) (discussing the high requirements such state action would have to
meet).
197. Smith, 443 U.S. at 98.
198. Id. at 103.
199. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
200. Id.
201. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001).
202. Id. at 518.
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school board.20 3 During the call, one of the parties mentioned,
"go[ing] to... [the] homes" of school board members to "blow off
their front porches."20 4 A radio commentator, who received a copy of
the intercepted call in his mailbox, broadcasted it on his talk
show.205 The question was whether the radio commentator could be
penalized under the Wiretap Act for publishing the recorded cell
phone conversation. 20 6
As the Court explained, the case presented a "conflict between
interests of the highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues,
and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more
specifically, in fostering private speech." 207 The Court underscored
that the "fear of public disclosure of private conversations might
well have a chilling effect on private speech."208 For the Court, there
were free speech interests "on both sides of the constitutional
calculus." 209 The Court distinguished the free speech interests in
certain types of communications. According to the Court, "some
intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others, and.., the
disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even
greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself."210
The Court struck down the penalties assessed against the radio
commentator as unconstitutional because the private
communications concerned negotiations over the proper level of
compensation for teachers that were "unquestionably a matter of
public concern."211 As the Court underscored, Bartnicki did not
involve the nonconsensual publication of "trade secrets or domestic
gossip or other information of purely private concern." 212  Citing
Florida Star v. B.J.F.,213 the Court noted that "[w]e continue to
believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests
presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and privacy
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case."21 4 The
Court ruled that the privacy concerns vindicated by the Wiretap Act
had to "give way" to "the interest in publishing matters of public
importance."21 5  The Court held that even though the journalist
203. Id.
204. Id. at 518-19.
205. Id. at 519.
206. See id. at 520-21.
207. Id. at 518.
208. Id. at 533.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 535.
212. Id. at 533.
213. 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
214. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514.
215. Id. at 534.
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knew the conversation had been illegally obtained in violation of the
federal Wiretap Act, the First Amendment protected its
broadcast. 216
As the Court suggested in Bartnicki, the state interest in
protecting the privacy of communications may be "strong enough to
justify the application of' the federal Wiretap Act if they involve
matters "of purely private concern."217  Free speech scholar Neil
Richards has argued, and we agree, that the Bartnicki rule thus has
a built-in exception: regulations regarding the nonconsensual
disclosure of private communications that are not of legitimate
concern to the public deserve a lower level of First Amendment
scrutiny.218 Following that reasoning, courts have upheld civil
penalties under the federal Wiretap Act where the unwanted
disclosures of private communications involved "purely private
matters."219
B. Public Disclosure of Private Fact Tort
Along similar lines, lower courts have upheld the
constitutionality of the public disclosure of private fact tort claims
where the private facts disclosed did not concern newsworthy
matters, that is, matters of legitimate public interest.220  The
constitutionality of the privacy tort in cases involving the
nonconsensual disclosure of sex videos is well established.221 In
Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.,222 an adult
entertainment company obtained a copy of a sex video made by the
216. Id. at 518.
217. Id. at 533.
218. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 357, 378 (2011).
219. See, e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 2003)
(upholding civil penalties under the federal Wiretap Act for the disclosure of the
contents of intercepted phone calls concerning a woman's private discussion
with friends and family regarding an ongoing dispute with a neighbor because
the intercepted call involved purely private matters).
220. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 74. The public disclosure of private
fact tort builds First Amendment protections into the claim itself by excluding
from the tort private facts that are newsworthy. To state a claim for public
disclosure of private fact, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant published
a private fact about the plaintiff that does not involve newsworthy matters and
whose publication would highly offend the reasonable person. Citron, supra
note 112, at 1828-29; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 394-96
(1960).
221. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm't Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D.
Cal. 1998); see also SOLOVE, FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 22, at 129, 160;
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 987-89 (2003) (arguing that the
disclosure tort can be balanced with the First Amendment where the speech
addresses private concerns).
222. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
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celebrity couple, Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson Lee.223 The
couple sought to enjoin the defendant from publishing the tape on
the grounds that its publication would mean the commission of the
tort of public disclosure of private fact.224 The court found for the
plaintiffs, reasoning that the public has no legitimate interest in
graphic depictions of the "most intimate aspects of' a celebrity
couple's relationship.225 As the court explained, "sexual relations
are among the most private of private affairs, and that a video
recording of two individuals engaged in such relations represents
the deepest possible intrusion into such affairs." 226
These cases support the constitutionality of narrowly crafted
revenge porn laws criminalizing the publication of someone's sexual
images in violation of their understanding that the images would be
kept private. The proposed New York bill and California statute, for
instance, protect the interest in individual privacy and, in
particular, the interest in fostering private sexual expression. 227
Sexually themed images constitute psychologically and financially
harmful breaches of social norms that satisfy the "purely private
matters" exception in the Smith line of authority. 228 As Neil
Richards puts it, "[ulnwanted publication of a sex video would seem
to cause much greater injury, and to be far less necessary to public
debate."229
The Court's recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps230 supports the
notion that the nonconsensual disclosure of sexual images
constitutes purely private matters deserving less First Amendment
protection. 231  Snyder concerned the Westboro Baptist Church's
picketing of a soldier's funeral with signs suggesting that the
soldiers' deaths are God's way of punishing the United States for its
tolerance of homosexuality. 232 In 2006, the church's pastor, Fred
Phelps, obtained police approval to protest on public land 1,000 feet
from the church where the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq,
Matthew Snyder, would be held.233 The protestors' signs read, "God
Hates the USA," "America is Doomed," "God Hates You," "You're
Going to Hell," and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers."234 Albert Snyder
223. Id. at 827.
224. Id. at 828, 839-40.
225. Id. at 840.
226. Id. at 841.
227. Cf. supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
228. See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979).
229. See NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
INFORMATION IN A DIGITAL AGE (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
230. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
231. Id. at 1220.
232. Id. at 1216.
233. Id. at 1213.
234. Id.
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sued Phelps and members of his church for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 235 The jury award was in the millions. 236
The Supreme Court overruled the decision in favor of the
Westboro Baptist Church. 237 As the Chief Justice held, Snyder's
emotional distress claim transgressed the First Amendment because
the protest constituted speech of the highest importance-views on
public matters like "the political and moral conduct of the United
States... homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
Catholic" Church. 238 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
explained that speech on public matters deserves rigorous protection
in order to prevent the stifling of debate essential to democratic self-
governance. 239 In contrast, the Chief Judge explained, speech about
purely private matters receives less vigorous protection because the
threat of liability would not risk chilling the "meaningful dialogue of
ideas."240  The majority pointed to a government employer's
regulation of videos showing an employee engaged in sexual
activity. 241  Such regulation was constitutionally permissible
because sex videos shed no light on the employer's operation or
functionality, but rather involved purely private matters in which
the public lacked a legitimate interest.242 As the Court noted in
revealing dicta, sexually explicit images exemplify the sort of
"purely private matters" that deserve less heightened protection.243
Some have suggested that United States v. Stevens 244 ended the
question of whether speech can ever be regulated if it falls outside
the categories of unprotected speech such as defamation, obscenity,
incitement, or true threats. 245 This is a misreading of Stevens. In
Stevens, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1214.
237. See generally id.
238. Id. at 1217. The protest's location further convinced the majority that
the picketers wanted to engage in a public debate as they protested next to a
public street, which is traditionally used and specially protected as a forum of
public assembly and debate. Id. at 1218-20.
239. Id. at 1215-17.
240. Id. at 1215.
241. Id. at 1215-17.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. 599 U.S. 460 (2010).
245. Oddly, in discussing recognized categories of unprotected speech, the
Court in Stevens included defamation, citing the group libel case Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) for support rather than New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) or later individual defamation cases. Stevens, 559
U.S. at 468. Since the N.Y. Times Co. decision, scholars have long claimed, and
we tend to agree, that group libel claims would not survive "actual malice"
scrutiny. Generally, hateful ideas about groups concern matters of public
concern, as the Court in Snyder suggested. See generally Snyder, 131 S. Ct.
1207.
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criminalizing the creation, sale, or depiction of animal cruelty for
commercial gain.246 The Court rejected the government's argument
that animal cruelty depictions amounted to a new category of
unprotected speech.247 As the Court explained, First Amendment
doctrine does not permit the government to prohibit speech just
because it lacks value or because the "ad hoc calculus of costs and
benefits tilts in a statute's favor."248  The Court does not have
"freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside
the scope of the First Amendment." 249  The Court in Stevens,
however, recognized that some forms of speech may be historically
unprotected or entitled to less rigorous protection, even though the
Court has not recognized it as such explicitly. 250 But, as the Court
explained, depictions of animal cruelty are not among them.251 Not
so for the public disclosure of private fact tort and other long-
standing privacy regulations. As the Court held in Bartnicki and
Florida Star, laws protecting privacy are "plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society."252
Moreover, the Court in Snyder v. Phelps, decided after Stevens,
makes clear that the Court has not eliminated long-standing torts
like intentional infliction of emotional distress even though the
Court has not explicitly included it as a category of speech deserving
of less rigorous protection. 253  Although the Court has never
explicitly held that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
amount to a category of protected speech, the decision assumed that
such claims could be upheld as constitutional if certain conditions
were met-if the expression giving rise to the claims involved purely
private matters.254 In Snyder, the Court refused to strike down the
tort as unconstitutional, much as the Court refused to do so in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.255
With this construct in mind, when might revenge porn concern
speech on public matters deserving rigorous protection? What about
the application of revenge porn statutes to individuals publishing
the sexually explicit images of a public official without the official's
consent?
Consider the infamous images of former Congressman Anthony
Weiner. Several women revealed to the press that Congressman
246. See generally Stevens, 599 U.S. 460.
247. Id. at 472.
248. Id. at 471.
249. Id. at 472.
250. See id. at 478-80.
251. Id.
252. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)); see also
generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
253. See supra note 230-43 and accompanying text (discussing Snyder).
254. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
255. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Weiner had sent them sexually explicit photographs of himself via
text and Twitter messages on different occasions. 256 Under the
reasoning in Snyder, the public arguably has a legitimate interest in
learning about the sexual indiscretions of governmental
representatives. On one occasion, Weiner sent unsolicited images of
his penis to a college student whom he did not personally know.257
His decision to send such messages sheds light on the soundness of
his judgment. Unlike the typical revenge porn scenario involving
private individuals who shared their naked photos or permitted
trusted others to take them on the understanding that the photos
would remain confidential, this scenario raises important questions
about whether explicit material disclosed without consent can be
considered a matter of public import or otherwise constitutionally
protected.
The second set of naked images that Congressman Weiner
shared might have different First Amendment implications. In
2013, Congressman Weiner announced that he would be running in
the New York City mayoral race. 258 A woman, Sydney Leathers,
released sexually explicit images of Weiner that he had sent to her
while they were having an online affair.259 To be sure, the fact that
Weiner sent such pictures involves a matter that the public has a
legitimate interest in learning about, given that Weiner is a public
figure who had promised that he was no longer engaging in these
types of extramarital sexual activities. 260 But does the public have a
legitimate interest in the pictures themselves, beyond the question of
proof that the pictures were authentic?
In the first scandal, the pictures were proof of a congressman's
nonconsensual, potentially harassing conduct vis-A-vis a stranger.
In the second scandal, Weiner shared naked photographs with a
trusted intimate. The public interest lies in the fact that he was
having an extramarital, online sexual relationship while running for
public office, a fact that could have been easily demonstrated with
the numerous text messages exchanged between Weiner and
Leathers or with censored versions of the pictures in question. We
raise this issue not to come down definitely on the matter but to flag
256. Kevin Liptak, Weiner Estimates He Sexted Three Women After
Resigning, CNN POLITICS (July 25, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://politicalticker
.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/25/weiner-estimates-he-sexted-three-women-after-
resigning/?iref=allsearch.
257. See Weiner Apologizes for Lying, "Terrible Mistakes," Refuses to Resign,
CNN POLITICS (June 7, 2011, 6:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS
/06/06/new.york.weiner/ [hereinafter Weiner Apology].
258. Cyril Josh Barker, Weiner-Staying in Race, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS,
July 31, 2013, at 16.
259. Id.
260. See Weiner Apology supra, note 257.
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the distinction between the public's legitimate interest in knowing
about the naked pictures and in actually seeing them. 261
Another way to understand the constitutionality of revenge
porn statutes is through the lens of confidentiality law.
Confidentiality regulations are less troubling from a First
Amendment perspective because they penalize the breach of an
assumed duty, not the emotional injury of published words. Instead
of prohibiting a certain kind of speech, confidentiality law enforces
express or implied promises and shared expectations. 262
C. Obscenity
Might the Supreme Court find that nonconsensual pornography
amounts to unprotected obscenity? Noted First Amendment scholar
Eugene Volokh argues that sexually intimate images of individuals
disclosed without consent belong to the category of "obscenity,"
which the Supreme Court has determined does not receive First
Amendment protection.263 In his view, nonconsensual pornography
lacks First Amendment value as a historical matter and should be
understood as categorically unprotected because it is obscenity.264
Although the Court's obscenity doctrine has developed along
different lines with distinct justifications, nonconsensual
pornography can be seen as part of obscenity's long tradition of
proscription.
In Miller v. California,265 the Court set out the following
guidelines for determining whether material is obscene:
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 266
261. In his forthcoming book, Neil Richards makes a similar argument. See
RICHARDS, supra note 229, at 38. In discussing the case of celebrities who did
not consent to sex tapes being made public, Richards argues that naming
celebrities as adulterers may be one thing but publishing high-resolution videos
of their sex acts is another. Id. As he explains, we do not need to see celebrities
naked to discuss their infidelity. Id.
262. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 CoLUM. L. REv. 1650, 1670 (2009).
263. Eugene Volokh, Florida "Revenge Porn" Bill, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr.
10, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/10/florida-revenge-porn-
bill/.
264. Id.
265. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
266. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court provided two "plain examples" of "sexual
conduct" that could be regulated: "[p]atently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated" and "[platently offensive
representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 267
Disclosing pictures and videos that expose an individual's
genitals or reveal an individual engaging in a sexual act without
that individual's consent could qualify as a "patently offensive
representation" of sexual conduct. Such material offers no "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."268
D. Free Speech Values
Free expression allows individuals to express truths about
themselves and the world as they see it.269 It enables citizens to
make intelligent, informed decisions about self-government. 270 As
Justice Brandeis underscored, free speech is "important not just as
an individual right, but as a safeguard for the social processes of
democracy."271 Being able to express ideas and to listen to the ideas
of others is instrumental to our ability to engage as citizens.
The nonconsensual disclosure of someone's sexually explicit
images does little to advance expressive autonomy and self-
governance and does much to undermine private self-expression.
Maintaining the confidentiality of someone's sexually explicit
images, shared under the assumption that they would be kept
private, has little impact on a poster's expression of ideas. It
contributes little to public conversation essential for self-
government. The publication of revenge porn does not produce
better democratic citizens. It does not promote civic character or
educate us about cultural, religious, or political issues.
Instead, the nonconsensual disclosure of a person's sexually
explicit images chills private expression based on the fear that the
images would be shared with the public at large. Without any
expectation of privacy and confidentiality, victims would not share
their naked images. Such sharing may in fact enhance intimacy
267. Id. at 25.
268. Id. at 24. Volokh has written that:
[A] suitably clear and narrow statute banning nonconsensual
posting of nude pictures of another, in a context where there's
good reason to think that the subject did not consent to
publication of such pictures, would likely be upheld by the
courts .... [C]ourts can rightly conclude that as a categorical
matter such nude pictures indeed lack First Amendment value.
Volokh, supra note 263.
269. Citron, supra note 94, at 101 & n.286 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 785-89 (2d ed. 1988)).
270. RICHARDS, supra note 229, at 8-9.
271. Id.
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among couples and their willingness to be forthright in other aspects
of their relationship. Laws restricting disclosure of private
information serve important speech-enhancing functions. In his
concurrence in Bartnicki, Justice Breyer noted that while
nondisclosure laws place "direct restrictions on speech, the Federal
Constitution must tolerate laws of this kind because of the
importance of these privacy and speech-related objectives," 272 that
is, the interest in "fostering private speech."2 73 He continued, [The
Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the
challenges future technology may pose to the individual's interest in
basic personal privacy .... [W]e should avoid adopting overly broad
or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict
legislative flexibility."274 We agree.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this Part, we offer our recommendations to lawmakers
working to criminalize revenge porn. Our advice is informed by
First Amendment doctrine, due process concerns, and the goal of
encouraging the passage of laws that will deter revenge porn and its
grave harms. In the course of advising lawmakers working on this
issue, we have worked closely with civil liberties groups, including
the ACLU. We take their recommendations and concerns seriously.
Our recommendations are offered in that spirit.
Civil liberties groups rightly worry that if revenge porn laws
"aren't narrowly focused enough, they can be interpreted too
broadly."275 Digital Media Law Project's Jeff Hermes has expressed
concern that revenge porn laws might criminalize speech in which
the public has a legitimate interest.
Careful and precise drafting can avoid these concerns. These
drafting techniques are essential to any effort to criminalize revenge
porn.276 Criminal laws are vulnerable to constitutional challenges if
they are vague or overbroad. Defendants must have clear notice
about the precise activity that is prohibited. Not only does
legislation have to give fair warning to potential perpetrators, it
must not be so broad as to criminalize innocuous behavior. Let us
explore key features of revenge porn bills that can help avoid these
problems.
272. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537-38 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
273. Id. at 536.
274. Id. at 541.
275. Anne Flaherty, 'Revenge Porn" Victims Press for New Laws,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/revenge-porn-victims-press-new-laws.
276. This necessary care is not limited to revenge porn; any law that
regulates expression faces similar challenges.
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A. Clarifying the Mens Rea
Revenge porn laws should clarify the defendant's mental state.
They could require that the defendant knowingly betrayed the
privacy expectation of the person in the sexually explicit image. 277 If
that were required, a law could require proof that the defendant
knew that the other person did not consent to the disclosure and
that the other person shared the image (or permitted the image to
be taken) on the understanding it would be kept private. 278
The California law seemingly incorporates this notion. The law
only punishes intentional privacy invaders.279 It does not apply to
individuals who foolishly share someone's naked photos with others
without knowing they are breaching someone's confidence. The
current California statute only applies "under circumstances where
the parties agree or understand the image shall remain private."280
It would not reach people who repost nude images without
knowledge or agreement that the image be kept private.
B. Malicious Motive
The California bill goes too far, in our view, in requiring proof of
a malicious motive, specifically that the defendants intended to
inflict serious emotional distress. Other statutes have imposed
similar "intent to harass" or "intent to harm" requirements. 281 Such
requirements misunderstand the gravamen of the wrong-the
disclosure of someone's naked photographs without the person's
consent and in violation of their expectation that the image be kept
private. Whether the person making the disclosure is motivated by
a desire to harm a particular person, as opposed to a desire to
entertain or generate profit, should be irrelevant. Malicious motive
requirements are not demanded by the First Amendment and, in
fact, create an unprincipled and indefensible hierarchy of
perpetrators. What is essential is a statute's goal of protecting
privacy, autonomy, and the fostering of private expression, which
the Court has recognized as legitimate grounds for regulation. 282
277. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-55 (1959) (ruling in an obscenity
case that the mens rea of the crime must be "knowing" rather than mere
negligence to protect against overbreadth concerns).
278. That is the view of one of us (Citron). Franks would frame the mens
rea requirement for the lack of consent element to use a "knowing or should
have known" standard.
279. We borrow this phrase from Lee Rowland, who generously spent time
talking to one of us (Citron) about the constitutionality of revenge porn
legislation.
280. CAL. PENAL CODE § 247 (West 2013).
281. See, e.g., id. § 647.
282. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
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C. Proof of Harm
Revenge porn statutes might have a better chance of
withstanding overbreadth challenges if they require the state to
prove that the victims suffered harm. For instance, the California
bill requires the State to prove that the victim suffered emotional
harm. Lawmakers could extend coverage to other types of serious
harms described in Part I, such as economic injuries, physical harm,
or stalking. Free speech advocates contend that revenge porn
statutes should not criminalize postings that have no impact on
victims. That argument certainly should be considered as
lawmakers work on revenge porn bills.283
D. Clear Exemptions
Revenge porn bills should include exemptions that guard
against the criminalization of disclosures concerning matters of
public interest, such as the Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin
bills do. 28 4 They should make clear that it is a crime to distribute
someone's sexually explicit images if and only if those images do not
concern matters of public importance. Worded that way, a law
would not apply, for example, to Syndey Leathers, the woman who
published former Congressman and mayoral candidate Anthony
Weiner's intimate pictures. Such an exception would help reflect
the state of First Amendment doctrine; it would not alleviate
overbreadth problems.
E. Specific Definitions
Revenge porn statutes must provide clear and specific
definitions of certain key terms. For instance, legislators have
provided specific and narrow definitions of "sexually explicit" and
"nude" images so that defendants have a clear understanding of the
images covered by the statutes. Maryland, New Jersey, and
California include narrow definitions of "sexually explicit" and
"nude" images.
Revenge porn bills should also clarify what lawmakers mean by
"disclosure." Disclosure could mean showing a single other person,
such as sharing a cell phone photograph with another person or
sending a person's nude photograph to her employer. It could,
however, have a more narrow meaning: publicity to a wide audience.
We believe that a broader definition is in order, since nonconsensual
pornography can have a devastating impact if shown to one other
283. On this point we may be at odds. Franks disagrees that proof of harm
should be an essential component of a revenge porn bill, as no such similar
component seems to be required by other forms of sexual surveillance or
abuse. Citron believes that such proof may be required to overcome
overbreadth concerns.
284. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
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person. Victims have lost their jobs after perpetrators e-mailed
their nude photos to their employers. They experience great shame
knowing that an employer or client has seen their nude photo
without their consent. The harms of revenge porn can be as
powerful if seen by one person as by hundreds.
F. Penalty
The ideal penalty for nonconsensual pornography is another
contested issue. If the conduct is categorized as a mere
misdemeanor, it risks sending the message that the harm caused to
victims is not that severe. Such categorization also decreases
incentives for law enforcement to dedicate the resources necessary
to adequately investigate such conduct. At the same time, criminal
laws that are more punitive will face stricter examination and
possible public resistance. Although California's categorization of
revenge porn as a misdemeanor sends a weak message to would-be
perpetrators and will be a less effective deterrent than a law like
New Jersey's, 28 5 it may have aided the law's passage.
On March 26, 2014, Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA)
announced that she would be sponsoring criminal legislation against
nonconsensual pornography. 28 6 We support the federal criminal
prohibition of nonconsensual pornography because it would reach
online acts that are not covered by state law.28 7 Congress could
amend the federal cyber-stalking statute, § 2261A, with the features
we suggested above in mind.288
Such a law would not weaken § 230 protections by exposing
search engines, Internet service providers ("ISPs"), and most content
hosts to potential liability. A law drafted as we suggest would not
involve any alteration of § 230, nor would it target most online
platforms. It would only prohibit the disclosure of someone's
sexually explicit images if the defendant had the requisite mens rea.
The law is, in this and other respects, in harmony with the goals of §
230, which distinguishes between interactive computer services and
information content providers. It is true that Internet
285. The ACLU initially objected to the California bill and then withdrew its
opposition on the grounds that the statute was sufficiently narrow to comport
with the First Amendment.
286. One of us (Franks) is assisting Rep. Speier's office in drafting the
federal legislation. Steven Nelson, Federal "Revenge Porn" Bill Will Seek to
Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/03/26/federal-revenge.porn-bill-will-
seek-to-shrivel-booming-internet-fad.
287. The U.S. Constitution permits federal lawmakers to regulate the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including the Internet.
288. See Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law
Response to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need.a-federal-
criminal-law-response-to-revenge-porn.html.
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intermediaries would not be able to raise a § 230 defense in the
unlikely event of prosecution, but this would not mean that they
could not raise any other, more relevant defenses.
If nonconsensual pornography were to become a federal crime, it
would be one of thousands of existing federal crimes for which no
Internet entity can raise a § 230 defense. Search engines and ISPs
have had to work around federal criminal law for many years now,
and this fact has not resulted in anything approaching the "death" of
the Internet or of the free exchange of ideas.
Federal criminalization of certain forms of online content, far
from becoming a burden for search engines, ISPs, and other entities
providing interactive computer services, can actually lead to
important and voluntary innovations by signaling the seriousness of
the damage caused to victims. Google and Microsoft's recent efforts
with regard to child pornography are an admirable case in point.289
CONCLUSION
We write this Article at a time of great possibility for the
criminalization of nonconsensual pornography. On October 12,
2013, the New York Times editorial board endorsed our efforts as
Board Members of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative in helping
legislators craft criminal prohibitions of revenge porn. 290 As the
editorial board urged, "Although lawmakers can't do much to help
their constituents with these difficulties, they can work to provide
recourse for when exes seek revenge through un-consensual
pornography."291 States, along with the federal government, should
craft narrow statutes that prohibit the publication of nonconsensual
pornography. Such efforts are indispensable for victims whose lives
are upended by images they shared or permitted to be taken on the
understanding that they would remain confidential. No one should
be able to turn others into objects of pornography without their
consent. Doing so ought to be a criminal act. In this Article, we
have laid out why this is the case, offered our assessment of recent
legislative proposals, and addressed First Amendment concerns. We
289. Alanna Petroff, Google, Microsoft Move to Block Child Porn,
CNNMONEY (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/18
/technology/google-microsoft-child-porn.
290. Editorial, Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2013, at SR10. The Chicago Tribune editorial board expressed a similar view:
"The First Amendment can coexist fine with laws against revenge porn-as it
does with laws against child porn, incitements to violence and sexual
harassment." Sordid Revenge: Using Explicit Photos to Embarrass Should Be a
Crime, CHI. TRIB., (Feb. 2, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-
02/opinion/ct-revenge-porn-edit-0202-20140202_1_mary-anne-franks-explicit-
photos-sexual-images.
291. Id.
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hope, in time, to see lawmakers follow our advice and ensure the
protection of victims.
